Abstract -Benefi t reductions will likely be a part of the eventual
INTRODUCTION

S
ocial Security in the United States is projected to remain solvent only until 2041, according to the intermediate assumptions of the U.S. Social Security Administration Board of Trustees (2005) . To prepare for the anticipated subsequent shortfalls, a number of potential remedies have been identifi ed. These proposals generally cut benefi ts, increase taxes, or seek to provide greater returns to Social Security assets. After his reelection in November 2004, President George W. Bush pushed Social Security reform to the top of his domestic agenda. His thrust of reform stems from the President's Commission to Strengthen Social Security's Final Report, which was published in December 2001. President Bush directed the Commission to study Social Security reform options under certain constraints, including that benefi ts could not be changed for current or near retirees, that payroll taxes could not be increased, and that reform must include a role for voluntary personal retirement accounts. The Bush administration's preferred path of reform is related to Plan #2 of the Commission's report. In line with the President's ideas about an "ownership society," Plan #2 would allow workers to voluntarily divert four percentage points of their payroll tax (initially capped at $1,000 for people earning more than $50,000 a year) into a personal account, which could be vested into a range of fi nancial assets.
But the personal accounts would do little to fix the long-run fi nancing problems of Social Security as conceded by the Administration (Furman and Greenstein, 2005) . As such, since tax increases could not be considered, the goal of achieving 75-year projected solvency for the Social Security Trust Fund will be reached through benefi t reductions in the President's plans. In particular, Plan #2 includes a type of "price indexing" benefit reduction. For young workers, payroll taxes would continue growing in real terms, while benefi ts would stay at the same real level. Because of price indexing, someone presently aged 30 could expect an initial benefi t that is 23 percent lower than the presently legislated values, while the corresponding reductions for 20-yearolds and 10-year-olds are 31 percent and 38 percent, respectively. Indeed, price indexing places an increasingly larger burden on younger people. Plan #2 would create sustainability for the Social Security Trust Fund by gradually reducing the replacement rate of initial benefi ts from traditional Social Security to career earnings under the assumption that workers could make up the difference with their personal accounts. Because initial Social Security benefi ts would no longer keep pace with wages, price indexing provides a way to gradually reduce the role of the traditional Social Security retirement benefi ts in American life, replacing it with the defi ned-contribution personal account.
But price indexing is not the only possible benefi t cut, and our goal is to consider the effects of a variety of benefi t cuts on the income distribution and poverty rates of the elderly. We are motivated by a desire to examine both the intragenerational and intergenerational implications of different benefi t reductions. The benefi t cuts we examine fall into three general categories: across-the-board benefi t reductions, price indexing, and reductions to the cost-of-living adjustment (COLA). Furthermore, we will consider different versions of each type of benefi t cut. Some benefi t cuts are expected to provide full solvency for the Trust Fund over the 75-year horizon, while others will provide about 73 to 75 percent of the changes needed for solvency. Additionally, some of these benefi t cuts will be progressive, because the degree of benefi t reduction will be larger for those with higher lifetime incomes. For these reforms, we quantify the impact of benefi t reductions on the income and poverty rates of the elderly. We also examine the impact of benefi t reductions on the poverty gap, which is the dollar amount required to ensure that everyone has an income at least equal to their poverty threshold. We then compare the savings for the Trust Fund to the increased poverty gap as a way to check whether the reform can improve the Trust Fund's status while still providing room to develop income guarantees.
We fi nd that any of the benefi t reductions we consider could be designed in a way to provide income guarantees to keep the elderly out of poverty, while still helping to fund signifi cant portions of the future Social Security Trust Fund imbalances. Nevertheless, there are important differences between the types of reforms. Among the versions of the reform proposals that are expected to lead to Trust Fund balance, an across-the-board benefi t reduction would force current and near retirees to share the benefi t reductions with future generations, which will signifi cantly help the plight of young people. These benefit cuts would reduce the incomes of the poorest elderly by 12 to 14 percent and would affect each generation equally. This is dwarfed, however, by the eventual impacts of price indexing. Price indexing does not affect current or near retirees, so that even after 20 years price indexing will have the least impact on incomes of the elderly. But the impact of price indexing will gradually compound in future years to produce bigger reductions as one's year of retirement extends further into the horizon. After 60 years, the poorest elderly stand to lose 35 to 42 percent of their income.
The COLA reduction, meanwhile, falls in between these two reforms. It applies to current and near retirees, but not to the extent of the across-the-board benefi t reduction, because the COLA reduction would only begin to apply at one's current age for those over 62. Initial benefi ts available at age 62 would not be changed by this reform; only the subsequent growth rate of these benefi ts would be slowed. After 20 years, the COLA reduction will decrease the incomes of the poorest elderly by more than 15 percent and, after 60 years, by more than 16 percent. The COLA reduction also has the largest impact on the extreme elderly, who also tend to be positioned lower in the income distribution, which compounds the impact of the COLA reduction on elderly poverty. Progressive reforms do help to lessen some of these impacts, and it will be important for policy makers to design benefi t reductions that limit the impact on the poor. This paper shows that there is ample ground for developing such reforms.
BACKGROUND
We consider three types of benefi t reductions, each with different intergenerational implications. While these reforms may apply to current and near retirees to obtain the full contrast in possible intergenerational impacts, the starting dates of the reforms could be modifi ed to refl ect political realities.
Across-the-Board Benefi t Reductions
The 2005 Trustee's Report fi nds that an immediate reduction of all Social Security benefi t payments by 13 percent will restore 75-year solvency to the Social Security Trust Fund. This reform affects everyone in the same way. It has a relatively larger impact on current and near retirees than other reforms, which allows it to have a relatively smaller impact on future retirees. We also provide a progressive version of this reform, designed to close about 74 percent of the Trust Fund's imbalance. In the progressive reform, the size of the benefi t reduction depends on one's position in the Social Security benefi t distribution. For those in the bottom 30 th percentile of the Social Security benefi t distribution, there is no benefi t reduction. Those with benefi ts in the 30 th to 50 th percentile of the distribution experience a four percent benefi t cut. This cut is nine percent for those in the 50 th to 70 th percentile, 15 percent for those in the 70 th to 90 th percentile, and 20 percent for those in the top decile. 
Cost-of-Living Adjustment
Automatic Social Security COLAs became law in the early 1970s in an attempt to keep real benefi ts constant during a time of rapid and variable infl ation. Prior to 1972, benefi t increases were only occasional and intermittent. Under the current benefi t formulation, workers collecting retirement benefi ts see COLAs starting at age 62, regardless of their actual age of initial benefi t receipt. Subsequent benefi ts grow each year at the rate of the Consumer Price Index for Urban and Clerical Workers (CPI-W).
We consider five reforms related to changing the COLA. First, the standard modifi cation to the COLA analyzed by the Social Security Administration (SSA) is a COLA of the CPI-W less one percentage point, though the COLA would not fall below zero. The COLA reductions would only begin at age 62, so that any nonretirement benefi ts received prior to this age would keep the present-law COLAs. This is expected to close about 73 per-1 For progressive reforms, the specifi c reduction made for each percentile refl ect two factors. First, the combined reductions were calibrated to produce the desired savings for the Social Security Trust Fund. Second, numbers were chosen to create a relatively smooth pattern. cent of the 75-year Trust Fund defi cit, as reported in Koitz, Kollmann, and Nuschler (2001) . To obtain a reform that would approximately fi x the 75-year solvency problem, we use a COLA reduction that is 1.4 percentage points less than the CPI-W. We also consider a progressive COLA reduction that would close about 75 percent of the Trust Fund imbalance. Those in the bottom 30 th percentile of Social Security benefi ts would not experience a COLA reduction. Meanwhile, those in the 30 th to 50 th percentile experience a 0.5 percentage point COLA reduction, and those in the top half of the Social Security benefi t distribution experience a COLA reduction of 1.5 percentage points. Finally, we apply the "standard COLA" only until the ages of 75 or 85, respectively. Such a reform would close less of the Trust Fund gap, though it provides a way to limit the impact of the COLA reduction on the extreme elderly.
From an intergenerational perspective, the COLA reduction would apply to current and near retirees so that young people do not face the full burden of reform. In the stochastic model developed for hypothetical workers in Pfau (2003) , the COLA reduction was found to perform quite well in producing high rates of return from Social Security for a variety of workers relative to other reforms including price indexing, increases to the normal retirement age, and increases to payroll taxes. Several unique problems have been identifi ed with choosing COLAs, though, which must be considered. First, because the elderly spend more income on health care and prescriptions, Amble and Stewart (1994) fi nd that a basket of goods designed more specifi cally for the elderly grew on average by 0.43 percentage points more per year than the CPI-W between 1988 and 1993. This weakens the common argument about the CPI overstating true price increases, when it applies to the elderly.
Additionally, the compounding effects of the COLA reduction also create the unique characteristic of transferring income from those who live the longest to those who die shortly after retirement, and it is the extreme elderly who may be least able to afford this change. Steuerle, Spiro, and Carasso (1999) also question the effi cacy of a COLA reduction on account that it will provide young retirees with a false sense of security. Many new retirees may not realize that their benefi ts will not continue to grow with the rate of wages in the economy or even with the general infl ation rate, so they will be less prepared to meet the fi nancial costs of extremely old age.
Price Indexing
Price indexing is the method for reducing Social Security benefi t growth used by the President's Commission to Strengthen Social Security (2001) . It slows the rate of growth in future initial benefi t levels by keeping initial benefi ts in line with inflation instead of the typically faster wage growth. The impact of price indexing compounds for each future generation as the replacement rate of Social Security benefits to income gradually declines. As real tax payments continue to grow over time while real benefi ts remain the same, such a reform is infi nitely sustainable for the Trust Fund and the payroll tax could be decreased over time while still maintaining the Trust Fund balance. Price indexing reduces the initial benefi t level, but then benefi ts would continue to grow with the same COLA adjustment as with present law. There are several possible ways to implement price indexing, as outlined in Biggs, Brown, and Springstead (2005) . The method used by the President's Commission starts in 2009 by multiplying the bendpoint factor ratios of the Primary Insurance Amount 2 formula by the ratio of the price index to the wage index (approximately 0.989 on average) from two years prior. 3 We consider three different price indexing reforms. According to the SSA in 1999, the "standard price indexing" approach used by the President's Commission is estimated to fi x 116 percent of the Trust Fund imbalance over the next 75 years, as calculated using information provided in Biggs et al. (2005) . In order to create a price indexing plan that is comparable to the other reforms, we consider a plan that is 80 percent price indexing and 20 percent wage indexing, which can be expected to close the Trust Fund imbalance. Additionally, we consider a progressive price indexing plan that will close about 75 percent of the Trust Fund imbalance. The idea of a progressive price indexing plan is motivated by Robert Pozen, a President's Commission member who popularized such a plan in 2005 (see Goss (2005) for details). Pozen's plan for progressive price indexing even received a recommendation from President Bush at an April 28, 2005 press conference. While our plan does not match the Pozen plan precisely, it captures the essence of the Pozen plan. 4 The bottom 30 th percentile of the Social Security benefi t distribution will not experience any benefi t reduction, because they keep full wage indexing as provided by present law. Meanwhile, those from the 30 th to 70 th percentile of the benefi t distribution will experience one-half wage indexing and one-half price indexing. Finally, those in top 30 th percentile will experience full price indexing.
METHODOLOGY
The March 2004 Current Population Survey (CPS) of the Census Bureau is used to consider a number of important questions about the viability of reforms that would alter the presently legislated levels of Social Security benefi ts. The CPS contains information on income sources for survey participants, as well as information about household and family relations. As is consistent with the existing literature, such as U.S. Social Security Administration Offi ce of Policy (2005) and Johnson (1999a and 1999b) , the analysis will be made in terms of "aged units." Aged units are defi ned as any nonmarried persons aged 65 or older, or any married couples in which at least one of the spouses is aged 65 or older. For married couples, the incomes are combined and assigned to the male whenever he is at least 65 or to the female when the male spouse is under 65. Persons who are married, but whom the CPS identifi es as separated from their spouse, are considered to be nonmarried, as is done in U.S. Social Security Administration Offi ce of Policy (2005) . There are 15,867 aged units in this sample. Accounting for two people in each married couple, there are 22,369 individuals in the sample. All percentages provided herein are weighted by the CPS population weights, and the aged units represent 37.9 million people in the United States, 34.1 million of whom are recipients of Social Security benefi ts.
This paper follows the approach of Johnson (1999a and 1999b) in that we compare the Social Security benefi ts for aged units to the hypothetical benefi ts that these aged units would have received had the benefi t reduction been enacted a pre-defi ned number of years ago. This approach assumes that everything other than Social Security benefi ts remains the same. In other words, the aged units do not alter their behavioral responses to the potential loss of Social Security benefi ts, and there are otherwise no macroeconomic feedbacks to the policy change. As such, the measures of additional poverty created by benefi t reductions are more representative of upper limits, because some people would certainly respond to the benefi t reductions by developing other income sources, such as additional employment or applying for Supplemental Security Income benefi ts, or by living with others to share expenses. Expanded employment incentives created by the benefi t reductions could also promote economic growth at the macroeconomic level. By applying reforms to the population of 2003, we are also implicitly assuming that the future age distribution 5 and income distribution of the aged units will remain the same. This is unlikely on account of current demographic and labor force trends, as well as because of the potential response to any benefi t reductions.
If the benefit reduction had passed ten years ago, then any aged unit would have experienced the reform for at most ten years. Typically, results are shown assuming a benefi t reduction passed 60 years ago. This length of time is only meant to indicate that the benefi t reduction had been passed long enough ago that all aged units are fully impacted by the reform. Also, price indexing effects grow stronger as more years pass from the date of enactment, and 60 years is long enough to demonstrate a signifi cant impact. This approach allows for a comparison of the benefi ts and incomes of aged units before and after the simulated benefi t reductions.
Another important issue regards deciding the appropriate income distribution for use in making the progressive benefi t cuts. We chose the distribution of average Social Security benefi ts per aged unit (the total Social Security benefi ts of a married aged unit are divided by two). Ideally, we would use a measure of lifetime income. 6 Social Security benefi ts provide a suitable approximation for lifetime income, because benefits are proportional to a worker's average indexed earnings during their career. However, the measure is not perfect because benefi ts are reduced for people retiring before the normal retirement age, and benefi ts are increased for those who do not retire until after their normal retirement age. The CPS does not provide information on retirement age or lifetime income, which leaves Social Security benefi ts as the closest available approximation.
Finally, modifi ed poverty thresholds are assigned to aged units. Poverty thresholds in the United States are calculated using several factors: the number of people in the household and the portion of these who are children under 18 years old, and for family units of size one or two, whether the householder of the family is 65 or older. Income used to determine poverty status is the same as the income calculated for the aged units. 7 However, because the defi nition of aged units in this 5 Ages in the 2004 Current Population Survey are topcoded at 80 (for those aged 80 to 84) or at 85, which poses a problem for understanding the effects of COLA adjustments on the oldest members of the population. To deal with this problem, we use the Social Security Administration's life expectancy tables to impute an actual age for anyone with a topcoded age in the CPS. 6 We wish to use lifetime income, because annual income measures are too dependent on current earnings and income from assets, as well as policy rules, to provide a suitable measure for assigning benefi t reductions. Aged units may experience large year-to-year fl uctuations of their position in the current income distribution. 7 The income of aged units consists of all their money income, before any deductions for taxes, union dues, or
Medicare premiums. Sources of income include wages and salaries, self-employment income (including losses), paper excludes members of the family or household aside from spouses, the poverty threshold we use may also differ from the offi cial CPS amount assigned to the household. In 2003, the relevant year for the March 2004 CPS, the poverty threshold for one person aged 65 or older was $8,825, while that for a married couple with the householder aged 65 or older was $11,122. The poverty threshold for a married couple in which the householder is under 65 years old is $12,321. Since we do not include the incomes of other potential family members, the poverty thresholds used here consist of one of the above three values assigned accordingly. The assigned poverty thresholds adequately refl ect the situation for the 77.54 percent of the aged units who do not live in a household with others. The remaining 22.46 percent of aged units live with other people. In many cases, this larger family structure may allow members to share economic resources with one another and enjoy the economies of scale associated with cohabitation. For this group, the assigned poverty measures will tend to overestimate true poverty needs. Nonetheless, since we only consider the income of the aged unit, it is reasonable to reassign poverty thresholds that are applicable to these specifi c units, rather than using the larger thresholds that assume a possibility of income derived from other family members as well. These measures present, to some degree, the possibilities of self-suffi ciency for the aged units. On the other hand, a small portion of aged units are responsible for the care of children under the age of 18 who need to share their parents' economic resources, and the assigned poverty thresholds may tend to underestimate their needs. Regarding the complete sample, 0.28 percent of aged units are single and live with children and no other adults, and 1.25 percent of aged units are married and live with children and no other adults.
RESULTS
First, we consider the economic resources available to the aged units in the March 2004 CPS. Then we quantify the reduction of income that would be caused by the various benefi t reduction plans. This is followed by a consideration of the impact of the benefi t reductions on poverty rates and the poverty gap. The section concludes with estimates of the savings these benefit reduction plans would provide for the Social Security Trust Fund, and whether the various benefi t reduction plans could present a sustainable solution to the solvency problems of Social Security. Table 1 provides the sources of income available to the elderly, who are grouped in terms of the ratio of their total income to their assigned poverty threshold. Ten income subgroups are included, which range from those with income less than 50 percent of the poverty threshold to those with incomes more than fi ve times the poverty threshold. The table includes the results only for those age units who receive Social Security benefits, since these are the people who will be affected by Social Security reform.
Measuring the Economic Resources of the Elderly
8 Sources of income are divided into six categories:
Social Security, Supplemental Security Income, public assistance, interest, dividends, rent, royalties, estates or trusts, veterans' payments, unemployment and workers' compensation, private and government retirement and disability pensions, alimony, child support, and any other source of income that was regularly received. It does not include non-money transfers such as food stamps, subsidized housing, payments-in-kind, health benefi ts, or other fringe benefi ts. 8 There are ten percent of the aged units who do not receive Social Security benefi ts, either because they are still working and have not claimed their benefi ts, or because they are otherwise not qualifi ed. The table demonstrates a number of important details, which help explain the distributional effects of benefi t reductions. First, over 90 percent of the retirement income of aged units with incomes less than 1.5 times the poverty level comes from Social Security benefi ts. For higherincome groups, the importance of benefi ts gradually declines as other sources of income begin to dominate, though Social Security benefits provide over half of the income for those with incomes less than 3.5 times their poverty threshold. Lower-income groups also tend be older than the higher-income groups. Related to this point, perhaps, as one moves up the income distribution, employment earnings play an increasingly important role. Additionally, those in the bottom income groups include a disproportionate number of unmarried females (and, consequently, fewer single males and married couples) and of aged units living in larger family groups. Reductions to Social Security can potentially have signifi cant impacts on the elderly. Table 2 shows how the benefi t reductions would affect the total income of the aged units across the income distribution.
Quantifying the Income Loss for Individuals
These are the simulated benefi t reductions, assuming they began either 20 or 60 years ago. The implication here is that because Social Security benefi ts play a more signifi cant role in the incomes of the poor, a loss of part of these benefi ts means losing a larger portion of one's income. At the same time, progressive benefi t reductions can help to offset some of this impact.
First, consider reform proposals that could be expected to solve the 75-year funding problem of the Social Security Trust Fund. These include a 13 percent benefi t reduction (Benefi t Cut), a COLA reduction of 1.4 percentage points (COLA), or a plan that uses 80 percent price indexing and 20 percent wage indexing (Price Indexing). All of these plans reduce the incomes of the lower-income groups by more, since Social Security benefi ts provide a larger portion of the income for these groups. The across-the-board benefi t cut has a standard effect not related to the passage of time. For those with less than 1.5 times the poverty level, the benefi t reduction reduces incomes by 12 to 14 percent, while the COLA reduction will eventually decrease incomes by 15 to 17 percent. After 20 years, price indexing produces the smallest decrease in incomes across the distribution (only four to seven percent), though after 60 years the income reductions from price indexing are significantly larger (35 to 42 percent).
Next, reforms that close about 73 to 75 percent of the Trust Fund gap include the progressive forms of the across-the-board benefi t cut, the COLA reduction, and price indexing, as well as the standard COLA reduction of one percentage point less than infl ation. The progressive benefi t reductions all share the property that those aged units in the bottom 30 th percentile of Social Security benefi ts per person do not experience any decrease in their benefi ts. This helps to limit the reductions in incomes for the lower-income people. However, those with incomes between the poverty level Note: The number in parentheses after the reform name represents the number of years since passage of the simulated reform. For example, a reform with (20) means that the benefi t reduction began 20 years ago. Descriptions of these reform proposals are provided in the Background Section. Table 4 provides more specifi c details about the effects of each reform on the Trust Fund balance. and 1.5 times the poverty level would still experience substantial benefi t reductions in line with other reform proposals. As for a standard one percentage point decrease in the COLA, the bottom income groups will tend to lose about 11 to 13 percent of their potential income had the COLA reduction begun at least 20 years ago. Finally, the other reforms include standard price indexing, which more than solves the funding problems of the Trust Fund. As such, the impacts on the income distribution are even larger than before, as after 60 years the lower-income groups stand to lose more than 40 percent of their incomes. Meanwhile, the standard COLA reduction applying only for certain age ranges can provide a small amount of additional relief by limiting the benefi t reductions for the extreme elderly. After 60 years, a COLA reduction applying only to ages 62-75 would still remove about nine percent of incomes for the lower-income groups, while the reduction applying to ages 62-85 would reduce potential incomes by 11 to 12 percent.
Effects on Poverty Status
With such large and nontrivial impacts on income, could the elderly population be expected to maintain a suitable lifestyle? Table 3 provides evidence of the poverty rates for aged units after the benefi t reductions. There are 34.1 million people included in the aged units who are receiving Social Security, and their overall poverty rate is 9.9 percent. Table 3 shows the poverty rates for different subgroups of the aged units 60 years after the reform begins. Of the reforms that close the Trust Fund imbalance, the benefi t cut would increase poverty rates by 3.8 percentage points to 13.7 percent. The poverty rate with price indexing would be 27.6 percent, and the COLA reduction would increase the poverty rate to 16.4 percent. Of the reforms closing about 73 to 75 percent of the Trust Fund gap, the poverty rate for a progressive benefi t cut is 11.4 percent, while progressive price indexing would lead to a poverty rate of 22.2 percent, and the progressive COLA would produce a poverty rate of 14.7 percent. The poverty rate with the standard COLA reduction is actually slightly less at 14.3 percent. Looking further down Table 3 , we see several trends. Older people generally experience higher poverty rates than younger people, single people experience higher poverty rates than married couples, and women experience higher poverty rates than men. The highest poverty rates occur among unmarried females, who consistently experience poverty rates of more than 20 percent, regardless of age group. Among the reforms that close the Trust Fund imbalance, the COLA reduction produces the smallest increases in poverty for those aged 65-74, while the across-theboard benefit reduction produces the smallest increases for the older-aged groups. Unmarried females aged 85 and older experience the highest poverty rates, and the benefit cut would push their poverty rate to 32 percent, while price indexing would increase it to 56.9 percent and the COLA reduction would increase it to 52.1 percent. These benefi t cuts are clearly having substantial impacts on elderly poverty, and these effects vary by age, gender, and marital status. Reforms including benefi t cuts should include provisions to better deal with elderly poverty. 
The Costs of Counteracting Poverty and the Effects on the Trust Fund
While benefit reductions can create rather signifi cant increases in the poverty rates of the elderly population, comparing incomes to a poverty rate is somewhat arbitrary, as a higher poverty rate does not indicate how much income is being lost. This section examines the poverty situation in more detail through use of the poverty gap, which is a measure of the total dollar amount needed to raise all incomes to the poverty line. In this section, we seek to determine the cost of having all aged units receive at least a minimum income equal to the poverty threshold, in light of the benefi t reductions. We then compare this additional cost to the savings that the benefi t reductions would generate for the Social Security Trust Fund. If the effects of the benefi t reductions on the Trust Fund are larger than the addition to the poverty gap, then it may be possible for policy makers to improve the status of the Trust Fund without pushing more elderly into poverty.
The details of this analysis are found in Table 4 . In the 2004 March CPS, the poverty gap for the aged units receiving Social Security benefi ts was equal to $7.7 billion. Among the reforms obtaining Trust Fund solvency, in the 60 th year after reform the benefi t cut increases the poverty gap by $4.5 billion to $12.1 billion, price indexing increases the poverty gap to $45.2 billion, and the COLA reduction increases the poverty gap to $16.8 billion. The progressive benefi t reduction reforms do better, though they also only close about 73 to 75 percent of the Trust Fund gap. The progressive benefi t cut leads to a total poverty gap of $8.4 billion, while progressive price indexing produces a poverty gap of $28.4 billion, and the progressive COLA produces of poverty gap of $12.4 billion, which is the same as the standard COLA reduction. The same approach applies for price indexing. Biggs et al. (2005) describe how the SSA last estimated the effects of price indexing using the assumptions of 1999, and they found that the standard price indexing approach described here would close 116 percent of the imbalance.
10 This corresponds to $153 billion of savings for the Trust Fund. Because other price indexing reforms have the same intergenerational implications, we fi nd that a proposal with 80 percent price indexing would save $129 billion for the Trust Fund, which is about 97.8 percent of the Trust Fund gap. We also calibrate a progressive price indexing proposal that matches the spirit of the Pozen reform approach, and we fi nd a savings of $99 billion, which closes about 75.1 percent of the Trust Fund gap.
Meanwhile, the Social Security Administration has estimated, as reported in Koitz et al. (2001) , that the standard COLA reduction plan applying to all ages beyond 62 would eliminate 73 percent of the 75-year actuarial defi cit. Because this approach saves $38 billion for the Trust Fund, and a COLA reduction of 1.4 percentage points saves $51 billion, we estimate that the later reform will close 98 percent of the Trust Fund gap. The same approach leads to estimates that the progressive COLA will also close 74.9 percent of the gap. For the COLA reduction of one percentage point applying only to ages 62 to 75, one could still expect that approximately 57.6 percent of the Trust Fund deficit could be closed, and the COLA reduction applying to ages 62 to 85 would close about 69.2 percent of the Trust Fund gap.
Comparisons of the Trust Fund savings to the increase in the poverty gap are quite favorable. For all of the reforms proposals, the savings to the Trust Fund exceed the increases in the poverty gap. Thus, any of the reform proposals could be used to shore up the entire poverty gap and still contribute to the long-run solvency of the Trust Fund. The across-the-board benefi t cuts produce the biggest ratios because these reforms add less to the marginal poverty gap after 60 years. The COLA reductions also do well. For example, the savings to the Trust Fund of the progressive COLA are 8.26 times larger than the marginal increase of the poverty gap. Similar results hold for price indexing, though the effects occur on a much larger scale. If standard price indexing had begun 60 years ago, then the savings to the Trust Fund would be $153 billion (almost half of the total expenditure of the Trust Fund at present), which is 2.69 times larger than the addition to the poverty gap of $56.8 billion. These results should help to alleviate concerns that benefi t reductions would push the most vulnerable groups of the elderly into extreme poverty, as the benefi t reductions could be combined with some other measures, such as an expansion of the SSI program, to provide relief both for the existing poverty among the elderly and for the projected Trust Fund defi cits.
SUMMARY AND CONCLUSIONS
We have quantifi ed the impact of different Social Security benefi t reductions on the income distribution of the elderly. We have taken care to show the impact both from the intragenerational perspective of the income distribution and from an intergenerational perspective. Our measures provide an upper bound for the likely poverty impacts, because benefi t reductions would cause some behavioral changes as people look for alternative sources of income. Nonetheless, we have uncovered some interesting trends. The incomes of the poorest elderly will experience dramatic effects from Social Security benefi t reductions, because large portions of the incomes for the poorest elderly come from Social Security benefi ts. There is an important intergenerational aspect to these income reductions. An across-the-board benefi t reduction would impact current and future elderly in the same way, such that the poorest elderly of any generation could expect to lose 12 to 14 percent of their incomes. The COLA reduction, meanwhile, impacts the current elderly to a lesser extent, so that future generations will experience a 16 to 17 percent income reduction for its poorest members. Price indexing, on the other hand, delays the impact of reform for a number of years. Each year the impact will slowly grow, and after 60 years the poorest elderly could expect to lose 35 to 42 percent of their incomes.
At fi rst, this situation appears somewhat bleak. However, the situation can be improved by using progressive benefi t reductions. Additionally, the situation appears more promising when comparing the ratio of Trust Fund savings to the growth in the poverty gap caused by the reductions. For example, the COLA reduction that is expected to close the Trust Fund imbalance is estimated to save $51 billion for the Trust Fund in the 60 th year after reform, while the corresponding increase in the poverty gap is $9.2 billion. On a larger scale, price indexing would raise the poverty gap by $37.5 billion in the 60 th year after reform, but save the Trust Fund $129 billion that year. This demonstrates ample ground for fashioning a benefi t reduction plan with income guarantees for the poorest benefi ciaries that will still help to improve the fi nancial situation of the Social Security Trust Fund.
Though the President's Commission uses price indexing as the tool for reducing the future obligations of the Social Security Trust Fund, the results of this paper should hopefully persuade policy makers not to ignore the possibilities of other types of benefi t reductions. Price indexing will eventually produce such large reductions in the replacement rates of Social Security benefi ts to earned income that that the political feasibility of such a reform for future generations is highly questionable. If a benefi t reduction is chosen as part of Social Security reform, then it is worth discussing more whether current retirees and near retirees should also share some of the burden of reform. Further research can estimate the behavioral responses to these reforms to uncover how workers and retirees will try to replace lost income. There are also grounds for considering a more complete picture of income that includes in-kind benefi ts and the shared resources within families.
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